Reference  ·  November 13, 2026

Slander of Title in California: Suing Over a Recording

The short answer

Slander of title is a tort claim for damages against someone who publishes a false statement casting doubt on your title to real property, usually by recording a document: a deed, a lien, a notice of pending action, a memorandum of an option or contract, or some other instrument in the county records. The claim has four elements, and each one can be contested:

• A publication. Courts treat a document recorded in the county records as a publication to anyone who searches title.
• No privilege or justification. A privilege can defeat the claim outright. Civil Code section 47 makes some recordings absolutely privileged and others privileged unless made with malice.
• Falsity. The document must be false, such as a claim to an interest the defendant does not have.
• Pecuniary loss. You must show actual economic harm, such as a lost sale, a lost loan, lost value, or the cost of clearing title.

The deadline is three years under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (g). Courts of Appeal have applied a discovery rule, so the clock can start when you discover the claim or have reason to suspect it, not necessarily on the recording date. A suit over a recording tied to litigation can draw an anti-SLAPP motion that shifts the defendant's fees to you if the motion is granted, so the privilege question should be answered before filing.

Can I sue someone who recorded a false document against my property?

You may be able to, but slander of title is only one of the available remedies, and it is the one aimed at recovering damages. The Court of Appeal stated the elements in Sumner Hill Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, 1030: "The elements of the tort are (1) a publication, (2) without privilege or justification, (3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss." The same court explained that "The main thrust of the cause of action is protection from injury to the salability of property . . . ." (Ibid.) Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051, put the fourth element as a publication that "causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss."

You need an interest the law treats as title

The plaintiff needs an interest that a false recording could injure. In Sumner Hill, easement rights that vested when the lot owners bought were enough. A claim based on adverse possession or a prescriptive easement that no court has yet established has been held insufficient because, as Sumner Hill quoted Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 264, "A title acquired by adverse possession is not a marketable title until the title is established by judicial proceedings against the record owner . . . ." (205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029.)

Falsity and the kinds of documents involved

Published cases have involved a deed the owners signed without intending to transfer title (Arthur v. Davis (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 684), deeds a title insurer drafted and recorded that described a fictitious 60-foot easement over the plaintiffs' land (Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 925), and a recorded notice asserting control over a subdivision road (Sumner Hill). Whether a recorded option, memorandum of contract or abstract of judgment is actionable turns on whether it is false and whether a privilege applies, document by document.

How this differs from the bogus-lien statute

A lien or other encumbrance, including a lis pendens, recorded by someone who knew it was false can sometimes be removed by petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 765.010, which AB 501 amends effective January 1, 2027. For a recorded real property document, that procedure can strike the filing and can carry a civil penalty, but it requires proof that the filer knew the filing was false and acted with intent to harass (or, for a filing against a public officer or employee, intent to influence or hinder official duties). Our article on false liens and UCC filings under AB 501 covers it. Slander of title is a different claim: it compensates for the harm the recording caused, and intent to harass is not one of its listed elements. Malice still matters when a qualified privilege applies or punitive damages are sought.

What damages can I recover for slander of title?

Pecuniary loss is "an essential element" of the claim. (Manhattan Loft, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057.) California courts follow the Restatement Second of Torts, section 633, which Sumner Hill quoted as allowing recovery of:

1. "the pecuniary loss that results directly and immediately from the effect of the conduct of third persons, including impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement," and
2. "the expense of measures reasonably necessary to counteract the publication, including litigation to remove the doubt cast upon vendibility or value by disparagement." (205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030.)

Lost sales, lost financing and lost value

The first category covers a buyer who walked away, a lender that would not fund, or a property that sold for less. In Manhattan Loft, an owner's declaration that two improper notices of pending action made it impossible to sell condominium units while the market fell was adequate evidence of damage at the anti-SLAPP stage. (173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1057-1058.)

Attorney fees to clear title, as damages

California generally makes each side pay its own lawyers, but in a slander of title case the fees and costs needed to remove the cloud are treated as damages, not as a fee award. Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 865, described them as "the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement." (Quoted in Sumner Hill, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030.)

Sumner Hill went further and held that "at least in cases such as this one where title was disparaged in a recorded instrument, attorney fees and costs necessary to clear title or remove the doubt cast on it by defendant's falsehood are, by themselves, sufficient pecuniary damages for purposes of a cause of action for slander of title." (205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031.) The court added that its "decision relates only to the particular facts of this case." (Id. at p. 1034.) It also upheld an instruction that fees need not be apportioned when they were incurred on issues common to the slander of title claim and other claims. (Id. at pp. 1035-1037.) Fees for work unrelated to clearing title may still be challenged.

Punitive damages

Punitive damages are available on a proper showing. In Sumner Hill, the jury found malice and awarded punitive damages against the entity that recorded the notice. (205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028.) The governing standard is Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), which requires proof "by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice."

What defenses stand in the way of a slander of title claim?

Privilege can end a slander of title case early. Civil Code section 47 creates two kinds, and the anti-SLAPP statute adds a procedural hurdle with fee consequences.

The absolute litigation privilege, section 47(b)

Section 47, subdivision (b), makes privileged a publication made in a legislative, judicial or other official proceeding. When it applies, the privilege is absolute: motive does not matter.

Lis pendens. Section 47(b)(4) provides that "A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged publication unless it identifies an action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right of possession of real property, as authorized or required by law." A notice that meets that test is absolutely privileged. Manhattan Loft shows the limit: a notice recorded based on a pending arbitration, with no court action on file, did not identify an action filed with a court, so "the litigation privilege does not apply." (173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1057.) The appellate courts disagree about whether a notice tied to a real property claim that lacks evidentiary merit is still privileged; our article on lis pendens expungement explains that split and the motion to expunge that the lis pendens statutes provide.

Mechanics liens. Recording a mechanics lien is treated as a step toward a foreclosure action. In RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, the court, following Frank Pisano & Associates v. Taggart (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 1, held that "the recording of a mechanic's lien is absolutely privileged, and does not give rise to a slander of title action even if the claim of lien is invalid." It cautioned that "not every cause of action based on the recordation of an invalid mechanic's lien will be barred by the litigation privilege," noted that an owner may still seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and recognized that an owner may try to show the lien was not tied to litigation contemplated in good faith.

The qualified privilege, section 47(c)

Section 47(c) protects a communication made "without malice, to a person interested therein" by an interested person and in related settings. It is defeated by malice. For this privilege, malice means a defendant who was motivated by hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff, or who "lacked reasonable grounds for [its] belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights." (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1337, quoting Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 413.)

Foreclosure notices are one example. Civil Code section 2924, subdivision (d), declares the mailing, publication and delivery of foreclosure notices, and performance of the statutory procedures, to be privileged communications under section 47. The courts have split on whether that means the absolute or the qualified privilege. Schep noted the split between Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316 (qualified) and Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1508 (absolute), did not resolve it, and held that the recorded notice of default, notice of sale and trustee's deed were privileged even under the qualified privilege. The borrower had not alleged malice, and the judicially noticed chain of title showed reasonable grounds for the recordings. The absolute-or-qualified question remains open.

The anti-SLAPP motion and fee shifting

A slander of title claim based on a recording connected to litigation can draw a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In Manhattan Loft, the court said that "The filing of a notice of lis pendens falls squarely within" the statute's definition of protected petitioning. (173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1050.) RGC Gaslamp treated a mechanics lien the same way.

Once the defendant shows protected activity, the plaintiff must show a probability of prevailing, including overcoming the privilege. Under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant's attorney's fees and costs." A plaintiff recovers fees only if the motion was "frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." The motion may be filed within 60 days of service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, later (subd. (f)), discovery is stayed while it is pending unless the court orders specified discovery for good cause (subd. (g)), and the order is immediately appealable (subd. (i)). In RGC Gaslamp, the owner's slander of title claim was stricken under the litigation privilege and the court affirmed an attorney fee award against the owner.

Not every recording is protected. In Diplomat Property Manager, LLC v. FortiFi Financial, Inc. (Sept. 23, 2026, D086371), certified for publication on October 20, 2026, the Fourth Appellate District held that recording PACE assessment liens before any dispute existed was not protected prelitigation activity. It compared those liens to deeds of trust rather than mechanics liens, reasoning that "neither deeds of trust nor PACE liens are created or recorded to redress a grievance." Diplomat was not a slander of title case, but its reasoning may matter when a defendant argues that recording a deed of trust, option or other consensual document was petitioning activity. Whether courts will apply it that way is not yet settled.

How long do I have to sue for slander of title?

Code of Civil Procedure section 338 sets a three-year period for "An action for slander of title to real property." (§ 338, subd. (g).) Unlike the fraud provision in subdivision (d), subdivision (g) does not say when the claim accrues.

The Courts of Appeal have applied a discovery rule. In Arthur v. Davis, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at page 692, the majority relied on the discovery rule for defamation and said "we see no reason why it should not apply to slander of title actions as well." It also observed that recording does not give the owner constructive notice for this purpose; otherwise, "an owner and possessor of real property would be required to periodically check the official records for wild deeds." (Id. at p. 691, fn. 4.) One justice dissented, noting that the slander of title provision (then numbered subdivision 7, now (g)) has no discovery language. (Id. at pp. 695-697 (dis. opn. of Levitt, J.).)

In the first Stalberg appeal, the court stated that the claim "accrues, and the statute begins to run, when plaintiff could reasonably be expected to discover the existence of the claim," and imputed the attorney's knowledge to the clients. (Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1230-1231.) In the second appeal, the court applied the Supreme Court's test that the period begins when the plaintiff "suspects, or should suspect, that [it] has been wronged," and held that the claim accrued no later than 1979 because of the attorney's imputed knowledge. (Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 925, 929-931, quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1114.) It nonetheless held the period equitably tolled while the owners first pursued quiet title, because they gave timely notice, the insurer showed no prejudice to its defense on the merits, and the owners acted reasonably and in good faith. (Id. at pp. 932-934.)

We have not found a California Supreme Court decision on when a slander of title claim accrues. The cautious course is to count three years from the earliest date you knew of the recording or had reason to suspect it was false, without waiting for a lost sale or other harm, and not to rely on tolling without advice.

Pleading slander of title with quiet title and cancellation

A false recording usually calls for two kinds of relief: removing the document and recovering the losses it caused. Slander of title does only the second, so it is normally pleaded with:

• Cancellation of instruments. Civil Code section 3412 provides that a written instrument "in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled."
• Quiet title. A quiet title action under Code of Civil Procedure section 760.010 and following asks the court to determine title against adverse claims, and its judgment can bind more than the named parties. Our article on how a quiet title action works covers the verified complaint, the mandatory lis pendens and the evidentiary hearing.

In Arthur v. Davis, the owners pleaded slander of title and cancellation of a deed and later added quiet title; a jury awarded attorney fees as slander of title damages, and the court cancelled the deed and quieted title. (126 Cal.App.3d at pp. 689-690.) The limitations period for cancellation or quiet title depends on the theory behind it and may differ from the three years for slander of title. Our guide to California real estate litigation deadlines collects those periods.

Practical steps before filing:

1. Pull the recorded document and note the recording date and the date you first learned of it.
2. Identify the document type. A lis pendens, mechanics lien, foreclosure notice, deed, option memorandum and abstract each raise different privilege questions.
3. Demand a release in writing. A written demand creates a record, and a release may end the problem without a lawsuit.
4. Document the loss: buyer or lender correspondence, appraisals, and time spent clearing title.
5. Weigh the anti-SLAPP exposure before pleading slander of title.

A seller's misrepresentation raises a different damages question; see our article on fraud damages under Civil Code section 3343. Our quiet title and partition practice handles title disputes for owners and for parties defending against them.

Common questions

This article is general information about California law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Statutes and case law change, and how they apply depends on the specific facts. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. Robert B. Mobasseri, State Bar No. 193193, ROMO Law Group, Encino, California.