Reviving a Lapsed Declaration in LA County Before 2028
Most people who own in a common interest development never read the last article of the declaration, which is where a surprising number of older CC&Rs quietly set an expiration date — a term of years, sometimes with automatic renewal periods, sometimes not. When that date passes and nobody has extended it, the declaration terminates by its own terms. The association does not dissolve, but the instrument that gave it authority over the common plan is gone.
That is a nuisance in an ordinary year. After a total loss it is a trap: insurance proceeds payable to the association sit undistributed because the document that says how to administer them has expired, and the body that would normally fix the problem has no live declaration to amend.
AB 2692 (Irwin), Chapter 124, Statutes of 2026, adds Civil Code section 4276 to deal with exactly that. It was approved by the Governor and filed with the Secretary of State on August 24, 2026, and because it is an urgency statute it took effect that day.
Three things about it are widely misunderstood, and all three matter to anyone trying to use it.
Why can't the association just extend the declaration?
Because the Davis-Stirling Act's extension mechanism only works in advance.
Civil Code section 4265 was written for precisely this problem, and the Legislature said so in subdivision (a): there are developments "created with deed restrictions that do not provide a means for the members to extend the term of the declaration," and "[i]f declarations terminate prematurely, common interest developments may deteriorate and the housing supply of affordable units could be impacted adversely."
But subdivision (b) contains the limit:
"A declaration that specifies a termination date, but that contains no provision for extension of the termination date, may be extended, before its termination date, by the approval of members pursuant to Section 4270."
Before its termination date. Once the date has passed there is nothing left to extend, and section 4270 governs amendments to a declaration — which presupposes a declaration. An association that missed the deadline had no statutory route back. Section 4276 is the route back, for about sixteen months and one county.
What does section 4276 actually require?
The operative threshold is in subdivision (a), and it is not a fixed number:
"Notwithstanding any other law, a declaration that has terminated by operation of the provisions that set forth the initial term of the declaration may be reinstated pursuant to this section if approved by the percentage of members required by the declaration for extending the term of the declaration. If the declaration does not specify the percentage of members who must approve the extension of the declaration, a declaration may be reinstated pursuant to this section if approved by a majority of all members."
The first point, and the one being reported wrong. The statute does not impose a 75 percent requirement. Press coverage of the 107-unit condominium development in Pacific Palisades whose expired CC&Rs prompted the bill has reported that AB 2692 requires 75 percent of homeowners to vote for reinstatement. That figure appears nowhere in the statute. If that community's declaration requires 75 percent to extend the term, then 75 percent is the number there, which is exactly the statute's design: it borrows whatever threshold the declaration already set for extension. A different declaration will produce a different number, and a declaration silent on the point produces a majority of all members.
Anyone budgeting a campaign for votes should find the provision in their own declaration governing extension of the term, which is the one the statute borrows, before accepting a number from a news story. If the declaration sets a percentage for amendments but says nothing about extension, the amendment percentage is not the operative number — the statutory fallback of a majority of all members is.
The rest of the mechanics are borrowed from provisions already in the Act, which is useful to know because it tells you whose practice to copy. The three-step effectiveness test in subdivision (c) tracks section 4270, subdivision (a). The balloting and diligence sentences in subdivision (b) are lifted from section 4275, subdivision (c)(2) and (3). The post-recording delivery duty in subdivision (e) is lifted from section 4275, subdivision (g). Under subdivision (c), reinstatement is effective only after all three of the following:
"(1) The reinstatement of the declaration has been approved by the percentage of members specified in subdivision (a). (2) Approval by the members has been certified in a writing executed and acknowledged by the officer designated in the declaration by the association for that purpose or, if no one is designated, by the president of the association. (3) The declaration has been recorded in the county recorder's office."
Subdivision (b) requires that balloting "be conducted in accordance with the governing documents, this act, and any other applicable law," and that "[a] reasonably diligent effort shall be made to permit all eligible members to vote." Subdivision (e) requires the association, within a reasonable time after recording, to deliver a copy of the reinstated declaration to each member by individual delivery under section 4040, together with a statement that it has been recorded.
Note what the certification requires: a writing both executed and acknowledged. Acknowledgment means a notary. A certification signed but not acknowledged does not satisfy subdivision (c)(2). Whether the recorder will stop it is a separate question: Government Code section 27287 generally bars recording an unacknowledged instrument, but subdivision (c)(3) requires only that the declaration be recorded and does not say the certification must be recorded with it. Do not treat acceptance for recording as confirmation that step (2) was done. The question will be asked later, by a title officer or an opposing party, not at the counter.
How long does a reinstated declaration last?
Subdivision (d):
"The extension of the terms of the declaration made pursuant to this section shall be equal to the number of years of the initial term of the declaration or 20 years, whichever is less."
Section 4265(c) does something similar for a timely extension, and the difference between the two provisions is the point. Section 4265(c) sets a ceiling — "No single extension of the terms of the declaration made pursuant to this section shall exceed the initial term of the declaration or 20 years, whichever is less" — and then adds, "However, more than one extension may occur pursuant to this section."
Section 4276(d) is not a ceiling. It fixes the term: the extension "shall be equal to" the lesser of the initial term and 20 years. An association reinstating under section 4276 does not choose the length; it takes what the statute gives. And section 4276 has no counterpart to section 4265(c)'s repeat-extension sentence, and is repealed on January 1, 2028, so a reinstatement under it is best treated as a single opportunity. A declaration with a 30-year initial term gets 20 years; one with a 15-year initial term gets 15.
An association that wants a longer horizon will need to reinstate first and then amend the term under its own provisions and section 4270, which is a separate vote.
Does the fire matter?
The second point: the fire is in the findings, not in the operative section. It does not control, as a matter of the operative text.
The fire is in the findings, not in section 4276. SEC. 2 of the bill declares a special statute necessary "because of the need to prevent displacement and promote the rebuilding of common interest developments that were damaged or destroyed as a result of the 2025 Palisades and Eaton Fires in Los Angeles," and SEC. 3 recites the same facts as the urgency justification.
Section 4276 itself contains no fire-damage requirement, no causation requirement, and no recency requirement. The only qualifying condition in subdivision (a) is that the declaration "has terminated by operation of the provisions that set forth the initial term of the declaration." The only jurisdictional limit is subdivision (f): "This section shall be applicable only to the County of Los Angeles."
So a Los Angeles County association whose declaration lapsed in 2009 for ordinary inattention, in a neighborhood no fire reached, is within the text. We have found no authority construing the section, and legislative findings can inform interpretation where a statute is ambiguous — but subdivision (a) is not ambiguous about what triggers it. An association in that position should take the opportunity seriously rather than assume the statute is not for them.
When does the window close?
The third point: the repeal has no extension clause. Subdivision (g):
"This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2028, and as of that date is repealed."
That is a hard repeal. Nothing in the bill conditions it on further legislation, extends it automatically, or preserves the mechanism for proceedings underway. An association that has not completed all three steps in subdivision (c) — approval, acknowledged certification, and recording — before January 1, 2028 loses the vehicle. Given that the three steps involve a membership vote under the governing documents' own notice and balloting rules, a notarized officer certification, and a recording, the practical deadline for starting is considerably earlier than the statutory one.
Counting from today, that is a window of roughly fifteen months.
What is still unsettled?
Several questions the statute does not answer, and no court has.
The gap period. A declaration that terminated in, say, 2024 and is reinstated in 2027 leaves a stretch of time during which the covenants were not of record as a live instrument. Section 4276 says the reinstatement "is effective after" the three conditions are met. It does not say the reinstatement is retroactive, and it does not address someone who bought during the gap. Whether a purchaser who took title while the declaration was terminated is bound by the reinstated covenants is a question of recorded notice and of the law of equitable servitudes — the framework of Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345 — not something subdivision (c) resolves, and section 4276 does not displace that framework. The vote is of "members," and a gap-period purchaser will ordinarily be a member under the association's articles and bylaws — but being outvoted is not the same as having agreed, and an association should confirm how its own documents define membership before assuming the point.
Title and lender treatment. Reinstatement changes what encumbers the parcels. Title insurers and lenders will form their own views about a declaration revived by statute rather than by the instrument's own terms, and those views will shape refinancing and resale well before any court weighs in.
What the repeal does to a completed reinstatement. Our reading is that January 1, 2028 removes the mechanism, not the recorded instrument. A declaration properly approved, certified and recorded in 2027 is a recorded declaration, the repeal of the authorizing section does not unrecord it, and subdivision (d) fixes the term of the reinstated declaration at the moment of reinstatement rather than year by year. California law draws the line at completed operation: a repeal does not undo transactions already completed under the statute, though it can abate matters still pending when the repeal takes effect (see Gov. Code, § 9606, "Any statute may be repealed at any time, except when vested rights would be impaired"). That distinction points the same way here, and it is also the reason to finish all three steps rather than be mid-process on January 1, 2028. That is our reading, not a holding; the statute does not say so, and no case has tested it. An association completing a reinstatement should expect to explain the point to a title officer at some stage and should keep the full approval and certification record.
Whether anyone will extend it. Section 4276 is scheduled to disappear. Associations outside Los Angeles County have no equivalent, and the structural problem — section 4265 works only before the termination date — remains statewide.
If your declaration has a termination date and it has not passed yet, the useful step is the ordinary one: extend under section 4265 while you still can. Section 4276 exists because that is easier to say than to remember.
Our contract disputes page covers covenant and CC&R enforcement work; our article on HOA rental restrictions and city ordinances covers the other half of the Davis-Stirling picture, which is what an association's documents can and cannot do to an owner; and our reference on California real estate litigation deadlines collects the other clocks that run alongside the January 1, 2028 repeal.
This article states the law as of October 5, 2026. We located no published decision construing Civil Code section 4276.
Frequently asked questions
Does AB 2692 require 75 percent of owners to approve reinstatement?
No. Civil Code section 4276, subdivision (a), requires approval by the percentage of members the declaration requires for extending the term of the declaration, and if the declaration does not specify one, by a majority of all members. The 75 percent figure reported in coverage of the Pacific Palisades development that prompted the bill is not in the statute. It may well be that community's own threshold. Look for the provision in your declaration that governs extending the term, which is the one the statute borrows. If your declaration sets a percentage for amendments but says nothing about extension, the statutory fallback of a majority of all members applies rather than the amendment percentage.
Does our community have to have been damaged by the 2025 fires?
Not under the operative text. The Palisades and Eaton Fires appear in the bill's findings at SEC. 2 and in the urgency clause at SEC. 3, but Civil Code section 4276 itself states no fire, damage, causation or recency requirement. The qualifying condition is that the declaration terminated by operation of the provisions setting its initial term, and the only territorial limit is subdivision (f), which applies the section to the County of Los Angeles alone. No court has construed the section.
How long does the reinstated declaration last?
The extension equals the number of years of the initial term of the declaration or 20 years, whichever is less. Civil Code section 4276, subdivision (d), fixes that length rather than capping it, so the association does not choose. Unlike section 4265, section 4276 does not say more than one extension may occur, and it is repealed January 1, 2028, so it is best treated as a single opportunity. An association wanting a longer term would reinstate and then amend separately.
What is the deadline, and why couldn't we just amend the CC and Rs instead?
January 1, 2028. Civil Code section 4276, subdivision (g), provides that the section remains in effect only until that date and is then repealed, with no extension clause. All three requirements in subdivision (c), which are member approval at the required percentage, a written certification executed and acknowledged, and recording in the county recorder's office, must be complete before that date. The membership vote and the recording both take time, so the working deadline is earlier. Amending was not an option because there was nothing to amend: section 4265, subdivision (b), permits extending a declaration only before its termination date, and section 4270 governs amendments to an existing declaration. Once a declaration has terminated by its own terms, neither provision reaches it.
Does reinstatement bind someone who bought after the declaration terminated?
The statute does not say. Section 4276, subdivision (c), makes reinstatement effective after approval, acknowledged certification and recording, and says nothing about retroactivity or about purchasers during the gap. That question turns on recorded notice and on the law of equitable servitudes, the framework of Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, rather than on the section itself, and we are aware of no decision applying that framework to a declaration reinstated under section 4276. A buyer who took title while the declaration was terminated should get advice specific to their chain of title.
This article is general information about California law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Statutes and case law change, and how they apply depends on the specific facts. Attorney advertising. Prior results do not guarantee similar outcomes. Robert B. Mobasseri, State Bar No. 193193, ROMO Law Group, Encino, California.